

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Jendayi E. Frazer
Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations
November 1, 2005

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify on our Sudan policy. Today I will review with you the U.S. strategy to maintain momentum on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and resolve the crisis in Darfur. Our primary goal is a peaceful, democratic Sudan that contributes to regional development and cooperates on counter-terrorism. Sudan is a challenging and complicated country and over the past 5 years we have made steady progress toward that goal. You ask: Are we losing ground on peace in Sudan? The answer is as complex as the country itself. On the North-South peace front we have clearly gained ground. On Darfur its back and forth, but we have a plan for progress. We also have to be watchful and take preventative measures to not lose ground in the East.

First, Mr. Chairman, let me outline where we are today. The National Congress Party-controlled (NCP) Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), bitter enemies that had warred for over 22 years, signed an historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. The United States led international efforts to achieve that success, and is committed to its full implementation. We witnessed on July 9, 2005, the installation of the Chairman of the SPLM, the late Dr. John Garang, as First Vice President of Sudan in Khartoum. Since then, members of the SPLM, the NCP, and other parties have formed a Government of National Unity in Khartoum and the SPLM and other parties a Government of Southern Sudan in Juba. These historic changes are major steps forward, but there is more for

the parties to do. Many of the national commissions called for in the CPA still must be stood-up, troop withdrawals are behind schedule, and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration needs to move forward, to cite three areas of particular importance.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement passed its first major test, the tragic death of its key architect, First Vice President John Garang. Garang was committed to the cause of a peaceful, prosperous, and united Sudan. While his death is a great loss, there is every reason to hope that his vision of a peaceful, democratic, and unified Sudan will be fulfilled.

Demonstrating the resilience of the CPA, Garang's successor, Salva Kiir, was inaugurated as First Vice President in an orderly process, and he has stated his unwavering commitment to realizing Garang's vision. In addition, Garang's widow, Rebecca, is carrying forward her husband's vision and is now serving as the Minister of Transport and Roads in the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).

Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize a fundamental premise of our strategy: implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolution of the Darfur crisis are interrelated issues. Implementation of the CPA is crucial to ending the violence in Darfur. Moreover, without progress in Darfur, there is a real danger for the violence to spill over into other areas of Sudan. Bottom line, the CPA is applicable in many respects to all areas of Sudan, and is designed to share power and wealth between the center and the periphery areas, a key root of conflict in all parts of Sudan. It serves as a framework for other political agreements, including in Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, Darfur is a complex and difficult situation. We, the Administration and Congress, have characterized it as involving genocide. We approach Darfur with the utmost resolve. The people of the United States know that this Administration, under the direction of

President Bush, Secretary Powell and now Secretary Rice, has been the global leader in efforts to end the violence and suffering in Darfur. President Bush was the first head of state to speak out publicly on the unfolding violence and atrocities in Darfur in 2004. The United States was the first country to call for action in the United Nations Security Council. We were instrumental in obtaining a ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), in April 2004. The United States was also the first to emphasize the need for intervention to stem the violence. As a result of our actions, the African Union agreed to deploy observers and troops to Darfur in August 2004. Since that time, the United States has worked closely with the African Union to build 32 base camps, and with other donors, provided airlift for over 6,900 African Union personnel now deployed to Darfur. This was possible with the over \$160 million in resources provided by Congress.

The effort the United States mounted with the international community has yielded significant results in Darfur. As a result of the African Union's intervention and pressure exerted on the Government of Sudan and Darfur rebels, AU-led political talks are moving ahead in Abuja, large-scale organized violence has substantially diminished since early 2005, and mortality rates have dropped.

That said, the situation in Darfur remains intolerable. Over 2.4 million people are living in camps for internally displaced persons, and another 200,000 have sought refuge in neighboring Chad. Violence continues to plague civilian populations, as we see in the current spike of violence, caused by banditry, actions initiated by rebel movements, and actions by government forces, and continued marauding by the Janjaweed. We continue to make categorically clear the responsibility of the Government of Sudan – now the Government of

National Unity – to both end support to the Janjaweed and work actively to stop its actions while ensuring discipline within the Government of National Unity's own forces.

Mr. Chairman, we must react to this spike in violence by pushing harder for full implementation of the CPA and insisting that all sides respect the ceasefire. Deputy Secretary Zoellick is leading a mission to Kenya and Sudan next week to advance the Administration's efforts to restore peace to Darfur and set the groundwork to achieve a lasting political settlement in Abuja. Because President Bush and Secretary Rice consider Sudan a high priority, the Deputy Secretary has visited Sudan three times since April. He has traveled to Khartoum, Darfur, and the South. Secretary Rice visited in July. I just returned from my first visit to Khartoum and Juba as Assistant Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, to implement our Sudan strategy, we are focusing on the following steps:

- Pushing the new Government of National Unity to ensure implementation of the CPA, including preparing the parties to stand up national commissions, form other key mechanisms, and honor their security commitments to form the Joint Defense Board, setup Joint Integrated Units, and withdraw Northern troops from the South.
- Actions to stop the violence and reach a political settlement in Darfur, including strengthening AMIS and pushing for the provision of 105 Canadian Armored Personnel Carriers, increased NATO training and advice, consistent understanding of the AMIS mandate, and UN logistical assistance and/or a blue-hat, and sponsoring a Nairobi conference for SLM unity.
- Strong support for the Government of Southern Sudan by helping to build the institutions, capacity, transparency, and infrastructure necessary for it to function. Including, moving forward with a limited program within existing authorities to help transform the Sudan

People's Liberation Army (SPLA) into a professional armed force, focused initially on refurbishing command and training facilities. First Vice President Salva Kiir is also visiting Washington today for meetings with senior officials and consultations on Capitol Hill.

- Provision of humanitarian assistance in Darfur and Southern Sudan. In FY 2005, we provided over \$650 million mostly in humanitarian assistance and support to the African Union Mission, and over \$450 million in reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to other areas in Sudan, including Southern Sudan and the three transition areas (Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and Abyei). Support for the return of those displaced from Southern Sudan.

Mr. Chairman, institutions in Sudan have changed substantially over the past ten months, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) led to a new interim national constitution, the formation of a new Government of National Unity in Khartoum, and a new entity in the South, the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). We have a strong interest in supporting the CPA, especially by working with the SPLM to develop new governmental institutions in the South and working with the Sudanese and international partners to support the commissions and other integrated programs designed to facilitate the peaceful transition to a unified government. For example, we want to consult with Congress about First VP Kiir's request that we allow U.S. companies to provide spare parts to rehabilitate Sudan's railways, to help facilitate the movement of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction supplies into Southern Sudan.

Congress and the Administration share an interest in keeping the pressure on the central government, but also in supporting the new Government of Southern Sudan. We need to consult with Congress about how existing legal authorities may need to be modified so we can reinforce

the SPLM while maintaining or increasing pressure on the north. I hope that I can work with you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee so we can more effectively address the challenges and opportunities of the peace agreement.

Mr. Chairman, let me shift to Darfur. Our support for the African Union is unequivocal.

- We are one of the largest donors for the African Union Mission in Sudan, having provided over \$160 million thus far to build the African Union's base camps, maintain equipment, contribute to the airlift of troops, and provide military observers.
- We convened a donor meeting in Washington, DC October 18 to discuss ways to further help the African Union.
- We continue to press the Sudanese government to provide flight clearance for all 105 of Canada's Armored Personnel Carriers for the African Union troops.
- We early on pressed for NATO support to the African Union. NATO continues to play a key role in coordinating airlift of troops and providing capacity-building training. We believe NATO can do more to strengthen AU capabilities.
- Following the visit of Secretary Rice to Sudan in July, we launched an initiative to combat violence against women in Darfur; as sexual violence continues to be an acute problem. We believe the Sudanese government must do much more to fulfill its commitments and we are determined to press them to take specific actions to protect women, and will support the expansion and establishment of women's crisis centers in IDP camps in Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, the African Union's expansion has clearly had a deterrent value. The African Union has performed admirably in a terribly difficult situation. Large-scale organized

violence has diminished and security has improved in areas where they are deployed. Local AU sector commanders have negotiated agreements between tribes to prevent violent flare-ups and are facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. At the same time, as the AU has expanded, logistics and above battalion-level operational problems have become more apparent and funding gaps more acute. We are working to identify additional funding for the African Union mission to address these shortcomings. We will also accompany the joint AU/UN/NATO/donors assessment mission scheduled for November, which will examine ways donors can further assist the African Union. The provision of Canada's Armored Personnel Carriers and other efforts will enable the African Union to vigorously carry out its broad mandate, which includes protection of civilians in imminent danger.

Mr. Chairman, we are also looking toward the future of peacekeeping in Darfur. We are beginning to discuss with the African Union how the UN can play a larger role. While we do this, we must be mindful that the United Nations is not the silver-bullet answer to peace in Darfur. Thus far, the UN has been slow to deploy to southern Sudan. The African Union has been the right force with the right mandate and has been successful in stabilizing the security situation in Darfur. The AU mission deserves our continued support even as we explore with our partners a possible future role for the UN.

Mr. Chairman, the heart of the conflict in Darfur is political, and the addition of more troops will not change that fact. As such, the United States strongly backs the African Union-led peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. We have sent a senior U.S. official as an observer and have provided technical experts to assist the mediation. We also support its chief mediator Ambassador Salim Salim.

The talks have had modest success; the parties signed a Declaration of Principles on July 5, 2005. The most recent round that ended on October 20, however, yielded disappointing results. Divisions within the Sudan Liberation Movement are largely responsible. We have made clear to the SLM leaders that they must resolve their differences so that rapid progress can be made. As part of his upcoming trip to the region, the Deputy Secretary will meet with the SLM leadership to insist that they develop a unified approach, to make clear that we are prepared to intensify our contacts with them if they respect the ceasefire and focus on negotiations, but to also make clear that they will become irrelevant to the process and to the future of Sudan if they do not.

Accountability is another part of our strategy. All parties in Darfur must be held fully accountable for their actions. In the UNSC, we pressed for the adoption of resolution 1591, which provides for targeted sanctions (including a travel ban and asset freeze) on individuals who meet certain criteria, such as committing atrocities. We did not stand in the way of the adoption of resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. As Deputy Secretary Zoellick has stated, “if people ask for our help, we will try to make sure that this gets pursued fully. We do not want to see impunity for any of these actors.”

Mr. Chairman, in order to maximize our leverage and to ensure cost-sharing to support efforts on Darfur, we are coordinating closely with the European Union and member states. We are also working intensively with key regional actors, including Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, Kenya and Chad, among others to end the crisis in Darfur and prevent an outbreak of violence in the East. As always, our humanitarian assistance is part of an overall international effort.

Mr. Chairman, as the Deputy Secretary has said, there are two paths for Sudan: an “upward spiral” or a “downward spiral.” The “upward spiral” is full CPA implementation, a

new and transformed Sudanese government, an effective African Union role in Darfur and Abuja, and reconciliation in Darfur (and other areas) within this political framework. The “downward spiral” is ongoing violence in Darfur that spills into other areas and undermines the government and CPA implementation. We have made clear to the parties that steps in our bilateral relationship will only be taken in the U.S. interest, and only in response to actions on the CPA and Darfur consistent with the “upward spiral.”

Mr. Chairman, the United States is on the right track and our strategy is moving forward with the strong support of President Bush and Secretary Rice. We believe we have the tools in place to maintain momentum and influence the parties. We thank the Congress for its strong interest in supporting our common goal of a peaceful Sudan.